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The Canada—U.S. Auto Pact of 1965:
An Experiment in Selective Trade Liberalization
ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyse the Canada-U.S. Auto Pact,a selective
trade liberalization agreement which created a duty-free North American
market for the major U.S. multinational automobile producers, but
continued to protect them from offshore producers. Thenew international
trade/I.O. literature predicts that, given the probable unexploited
economics of scale and specialization in the tariff—protected small
Canadian economy prior to 1965, rationalization leading tolarge
efficiency gains in Canadian production vis avisU.S. production would
occur in a free trade environment. We estimate that the Auto Pact did
not induce a substantial improvement in Canadian relative production
efficiency. The missing ingredient seems to have been the
competition-increasing effects of free trade in an oligopolistic setting
that is emphasized by the new trade/I.O. literature. The Auto Pact did
not increase the number of rivals in the oligopolistic Canadianindustry
since the major players in the industry had production facilitieson both
sides of the Canada-U.S. border before 1965, and no significantnew entry
into Canada occurred.
In the 1962-64 period, Canadian automotive productionwas 27% less
efficient than U.S. production. By 1970-72 this deficiency had been
reduced to 19%, but was not further reduced by the end of the 1970's. Of
the 8 percentage points reduction in the Canadian disadvantage,we
attribute only 3 percentage points to the rationalizationprocess induced











Manufacturingindustries in small economies, such as Canada, which
are protected by tariffs generally are believed to be inefficient
relative to corresponding industries in large economies such as the
United States. The reason given is that in a protected small market,
consumer preference for diversity implies that there will be too many
firms producing too many products, so that rationalization will not occur
because economies of scale and specialization will remain unexploited.
In addition, output price differentials between small and large economies
may be even higher than unit cost differentials if protection facilitates
oligopolistic coordination. In recent years there has been renewed
interest in the integration of industrial organization features such as
economies of scale and imperfect competition with the analysis of
international trade. Examples of theoretical contributions include
Brander (1981), Helpman (1981), Krugman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman
(1985). Recently, Harris (1984a,b) and Cox and Harris (1985) have
developed a numerical general equilibrium model of a small open economy
and used this model to estimate the effects for Canada of trade
liberalization policies. They find large gains in manufacturing
efficiency due to rationalization and output price reductions from a
movement to free trade, either unilateral or multilateral. Of particular
importance to this study is the fact that the transportation equipment
industry is a big winner, even when the tariff is removed unilaterally in
that industry alone.
In common with other numerical general equilibrium exercises,
Harris's results are based on a hypothetical experiment using crucial
parameter values which are not estimated from the data employed in the2
experiment. However, there exists an actual experiment in trade
liberalization -theCanada—U.S. Automotive Products Trade Agreement of
1965 (better known as the Canada-U.S. Auto Pact) which eliminated some,
but by no means all, features of protectionism with respect to North
American trade in automobile products.1 The Auto Pact was designed to
permit North American (primarily U.S. multinational) producers to
rationalize production facilities by removing, for these firms, the
Canadian and U.S. tariffs on transborder shipments of completed vehicles
and original equipment parts. The Pact thus opened up on a duty-free
basis the complete North American market to automotive products
originating in Canada.It was expected that, with tariff barriers
removed, producers in the small economy (Canada), who also were the
primary producers in the large economy (United States), would achieve
substantial relative efficiency gains by rationalizing production
facilities in Canada to take advantage of any economies of scale and
specialization that existed. It is important to note that tariff
protection from off—shore (e.g. European and Japanese) producers remained
and only "designated" manufacturers in Canada and the U.S. could take
advantage of the provisions of the Auto Pact -hencethe term selective
trade liberalization in the title of this paper. For example,
manufacturers in the U.S. had to achieve a certain minimum level of
production in Canada in order to achieve designated (i.e. duty-free)
status.2 The opportunity to rationalize was created by the Auto Pact,
but the oligopolistic industry in Canada3 was not forced to rationalize
by the cold wind of competition, as assumed in the Harris computations.
In fact, it could be argued (Johnson (1963)) that the Auto Pact increased3
effective protection for North American producers to the extent that
costs could be reduced behind an unchanged nominal tariff barrier applied
to offshore manufacturers.
In this paper, we analyse, using an econometric cost function
methodology in which the crucial parameters are estimated internally
from the historical data, the rationalization effects of the Auto Pact.
Since the automobile industry in Canada prior to 1965 was a classic case
of an industry with apparently unexploited economies of scale and
specialization producing exclusively for a small domestic market, one
would expect, if the Auto Pact were effective, to observe a substantial
narrowing of the Canada-U.S. production efficiency gap. During the
1962-64 period (prior to the Auto Pact), we estimate that Canadian
producers were 27% less efficient than their counterparts in the U.S.,
confirming the small, protected economy hypothesis stated earlier. By
1970-72, Canadian producers were still 19% less efficient than
U.S. producers, and by 1979 the gap had grown slightly to 20%.In
addition, of the 8 percentage points relative improvement in Canadian
efficiency by 1970-1972, only 3 percentage points could be attributed to
the rationalization process induced specifically by the Auto Pact. The
selective trade liberalization did not substantially improve Canadian
automobile production efficiency.
We also estimate that the Auto Pact induced a price decline in
Canada relative to the U.S. of only 3% by 1970-72. This is considerably
less than what would have been expected from the elimination of a
Canadian tariff of 17 1/2%, had the benefits of trade liberalization been
extended beyond North American manufacturers so that arbitrage4
possibilities could be exploited by individual retailers or consumers.
The selective nature of the trade liberalization appears to have
protected the oligopolistic automobile industry from the competitive
pressures that a policy of fuller trade liberalization would have brought
forth.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section II we present a
description of the Auto Pact and a discussion of the expected effects on
production costs of the provisions of the Pact. Section Ill provides an
outline of the econometric cost function model used in the analysis. The
extent and sources of unit production cost differences between Canadian
and U.S. producers over the 1962-80 period are presented in Section IV.
Section V analyses the Auto Pact per se through a counter-factual
experiment. We construct a set of production flows which we estimate
would have occurred in the absence of the Auto Pact and determine the
unit cost implications had the historical experience been altered. In
Section VI we provide concluding remarks and discuss the implications of
our results for trade policy strategy.5
II. THE CANADA-U.S. AUTO PACT OF 1965
The Canadian automobile industry is dominated by U.S. multinational
firms. Prior to 1965, as noted in the Introduction, both Canada and the
U.S. imposed substantial tariffs on the entry of assembled vehicles and
parts. The Auto Pact eliminated these tariffs for manufacturers of
completed vehicles and original equipment parts, conditional on these
manufacturers maintaining certain minimum production levels in Canada and
domestic content in North America. Hence the Auto Pact provided a
mixture of trade liberalization and protection. On the one hand, vehicle
manufacturers in both countries had potential duty-free access to
Canadian and U.S. markets. On the other hand, since only designated
manufacturers had this access opportunity, the production and domestic
content provisions required for designation might be expected to protect,
at least to some extent, the inefficient Canadian industry.5
The Auto Pact stipulated the following content and production
requirements for manufacturers:
1. For tariff-free entry of Canadian automobiles or original equipment
parts into the U.S. market, these automobiles must contain at least
50% North American (U.S. or Canada) content.
2. For tariff-free entry of U.S. finished vehicles or original
equipment parts into Canada, manufacturers in Canada must satisfy
the following criteria:6
a)Manufacturers must maintain a certain ratio between the
net sales value of vehicles made in Canada and the net
sales value of vehicles sold in Canada.
b)The amount of Canadian value added for all classes of
vehicles made in Canada must be at least as great as the
amount which was achieved in the base year (1964).
c) In each model year, the value added in Canada should
amount to at least 60% of the growth in the value of cars
sold in the base year (1964); for commercial vehicles
(e.g. trucks), the value added should amount to at least
50% of the growth in the value of commercial vehicles
sold in the base year.
d)Vehicle manufacturers were collectively to increase the
amount of value added in Canada between 1965 and 1968 by
a further $260 million beyond the requirements under (c).
All the above constraints potentially interfere with trade
liberalization and provide protection. Provision 1 protects North
American parts manufacturers from world—wide competitors. Provision 2
provides protection for Canadian parts producers and vehicle assemblers
vis a vis U.S. producers. Provision 2(a) biases production in Canada
toward assembly and away from parts production.
An observer of the provisions of the Auto Pact would be tempted to
conclude that there exists an obvious reason why manufacturing efficiency
did not improve substantially in Canada relative to the U.S. -the
provisions of the Pact prevented North American rationalization to the7
fullest extent desired by manufacturers. This conclusion would imply
that manufacturers were constrained by the content provisions of the
Pact —animplication which is contrary to the evidence. At no time
during the period 1965—80 have constraints 1, 2(b), (c) or (d) been
binding constraints. In most years manufacturers have exceeded the
minimum requirements by wide margins. Provision 2(a) was binding in 1980
and possibly 1968, but in all other years, manufacturers comfortably
exceeded the minimum requirements.6
Hence it would appear that the "safeguards for Canada" built into
the Auto Pact did not appreciably constrain the North American allocation
of production facilities or the amount of value added produced in
Canada. This fact would seem to contradict our result that Canadian
production has remained inefficient relative to U.S. production. However
it is not relative efficiency which matters in the competition for
production activity but rather relative costs. As we demonstrate in
Section IV, Canadian producers have remained cost competitive primarily
due to lower factor prices, and in the latter part of the period, due to
a devaluing currency.8
III. THE ECONOMETRIC COST FUNCTION MODEL
In order to analyse empirically the relative unit costs of
production for Canadian and U.S. producers and the impact of the Auto
Pact on Canadian production, we have estimated the cost function
specified below utilizing 3 digit data (vehicle assembly +parts
production) drawn from the automobile sectors of Canada (1961—80), the
U.S. (1961-80) and Japan (1968-80). The model is developed in detail
elsewhere (Fuss and Waverman (1985, 1986, 1987) and will only be
summarized here due to space limitations.
Utilizing the duality between cost and production under the
assumption of cost-minimizing behaviour7, we specify that the automobile
production process can be represented indirectly by the cost function
=Gt(wt,pit' T) (1)
where C1t is the total cost of production in country iat time t,
it is a vector of factor prices, 0it is a scalar of output and it
is a vector of technological conditions which could be viewed as the
'characteristics" of the production process. Characteristics used in
this study are an index of Research and Development expenditures (a proxy
for technical change), capacity utilization, and an index of the size mix
of vehicles produced. The use of this characteristics approach was
proposed by McFadden (1978) and has been applied to telecommunications
[Denny, et al. (1981a,b)], trucking [Spady and Friedlaender (1978), Kim
(1984)] and U.S. automobile production [Friedlaender, Winston and Wang
(1983)]. The logarithm of the cost function (1) is approximated by a
function in the logarithms of w, Tft andD; (where D is a
vector of country-specific dummy variables) of the form:9
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kll log Wkit (log T1t)2 (2)
where iindexes the country
t indexes the time period
k,m index the factors of production
9.,p index characteristics
D. =1if the observation is in country i 0
=0otherwise
and country 0 is the "reference" or "base" country.10
Specification (2) is a translog cost function with the exception of
the last (3rd order) row which has been added to insure that envelope
consistency between short- and long-run average costs (Viner (1952)) is
maintained within a suitably flexible functional form. The inclusion of
the dummy variable vector permits parameters associated with zero order
and first order terms of the cost function to differ across countries.
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(3)
Estimates of the parameters of the system are obtained by estimating
simultaneously (using maximum likelihood techniques) the cost function
(2) and K-l equations from (3), imposing the standard constraints
V V V
czk = 1, aki =0, ómk =0, 6mk =
kloAk0, ak_ 0, kll =0, (4)
and the envelope consistency constraints (see Fuss and Waverman (1985a)







The exogenous variables contained in (2) were specified as follows:
input prices (K=3) -capital(1); materials (2); labour (3)
output —constantdollar capacity (normal or designed) production
of vehicles and parts
technological conditions (L=3) —capacityutilization (1);
technological change proxy index -indexof
real stock of R & 0 expenditures (2);
index of product mix (3)
A description of the data used to construct these variables is contained
in Fuss and Waverman (1985, 1986) and especially in Fuss and Waverman
(1987, chapter 4).
The cost function was estimated subject to the regularity conditions
(e.g. monotonicity, concavity, linear homogeneity in prices) being
satisfied. Details of the estimation procedure can be found in Fuss and
Waverman (1985).
The lengthy list of parameter estimates are not presented due to
space limitations. These parameter estimates, along with asymptotic
standard errors and the usual diagnostic summary statistics also can be
found in Fuss and Waverman (1985). However, in order that the reader
have some feel for the estimated production structure, Tables 1 and 2
present estimates of factor price elasticities, elasticities of
substitution and other elasticities of interest.12
Table 2 demonstrates that production in both the U.S. and Canada is
subject to increasing returns to scale at the mean data point.
Surprisingly, Canada has the lower mean scale elasticity.9 The capacity
utilization elasticity shows that costs increase proportionately less
than actual output, so that there are short-run economies of fill.
Technical change appears to have approximately the same cost-reducing
impact in both countries.
The cost—product mix elasticities are very small. This is not
surprising since the output variable has been calculated from value and
price data so that it is denominated in "standard" units (see Fuss and
Waverman (1987) for details concerning the construction). If the
long—run marginal cost of producing a vehicle is proportional to weight,
then the cost-product mix elasticity would be zero. If there are
economies of scale (i.e., non—proportionality) in producing larger
(heavier) automobiles then the elasticity would be negative.
Applying a Taylor's series expansion generalization of the Quadratic
Lemma1° introduced by Denny and Fuss (1983), the following decomposition
of the inter—country unit production cost percentage difference at time
t can be obtained (Fuss and Waverman (1985)):
log (C1/Q1) -log(C0/Q0) =log(C/Q)
=
[Ski÷ Sko][log wki -logWkO]
+[ECQ1 + ECQ0 -2].[logQ-logQ0J
+ [ECT + ECT0] .[logT1- log T0]+ e.
10








cost with respect to output
cost with respect to the
characteristic
Following Denny and Fuss (1980), the index of cost efficiency difference
between countries i and o at any point in time is given by
slog (C/Q) = [Ski+ Sko] [log Wki -logwko] + CED1Q (8)
Combining (7) and (8) we obtain an expression for CED in terms of
efficiency sources:
CED10 = [ECQ1 + ECQ0 -2] [log Q1 -logQ0]
13
+ k1l [log Wki -logw0].[log Ti- log
T10]2
t has been suppressed for simplicity, and
(6)
lv
CED10 =Alog(C/Q) —L [Ski+ S0][log w.j -logwkO] (7)
The expression for CED in equation (7) is just the dual formulation
of the translog index of interspatial productivity difference introduced
by Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978).
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Equations (6), (8) and (9) provide the formulas for decomposing unit cost
differences and efficiency differences into their various sources.
Consider equation (6). The left hand side is the average cost
difference between two countries at a point in time. This difference is
due to differences in factor prices (the first row on the right hand
side), the effects of scale economies (the second row), the effects of
technological characteristics (the third row), the interaction between
factor prices and characteristics (the fourth row), ande0 (the fifth
row). The term measures any systematic cost difference between
the two countries not accounted for by factor prices, scale, and
technology. It will be called the country-specific efficiency effect,
and is presumably a combination of managerial and environmental effects.
Now consider equation (8). The average cost difference between
the two countries is due to differences in factor prices (the first
term), and differences in cost efficiency (the second term). Finally
consider equation (9). The cost efficiency difference between two
countries is due to scale effects (the first row), technological effects
(the second row), the interaction effect (the third row), and the
country-specific efficiency effect (the fourth row).15
IV. THE EXTENT ANDSOURCESOF COST AND EFFICIENCY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
U.S. AND CANADIAN PRODUCERS, 1961-80
In this section we present the empirical results on cost and
efficiency level comparisons between the United States and Canada using
equations (6), (8) and (9). The results are presented in Tables 3 and
4. Table 3 contains the unit production cost differentials for a number
of years and periods. The contribution" of each source is measured as
the percentage difference in unit production cost which would result if
the only difference between the two countries were that particular
source. In this calculation all other sources are held constant at their
geometric mean levels for both countries1 observations combined. Hence
the interaction effect will disappear as an explicit source of
difference. For example, the second element in the first row indicates
that if all that differed between Canadian and U.S. producers in the
1962-64 period was the price of labour, and all other variables affecting
costs were equal in the two countries at the geometric average of their
values in the two countries in the years 1962 through 1964, then unit
production cost would have been 6.0% lower in Canada than in the
U.S. (both costs measured in Canadian dollars).
Somewhat surprisingly, the data indicate that in the years preceding
the Auto Pact there was little significant unit production cost
difference between Canada and the U.S. as measured in Canadian dollars.
However the respective tariffs in the two countries were sufficiently
high to discourage inter—country trade. In 1962-64, considering only
factors affecting cost efficiency differences (CED) between U.S. and
Canadian producers, unit production costs would have been 26.9% higher in16
Canada than in the U.S. Over the fifteen year period to 1979 the
Canadian CED disadvantage diminished, but by only 6.7 percentage points.
We find that in 1962—64, scale differences alone would have accounted for
21.1% higher unit production costs in Canada than in the U.S., (where all
other variables are held at their mean levels). Wonnacott and Wonnacott
(1967) estimated that inefficient scale increased costs in Canada by
13%. Our calculations based on an estimated cost function show this
effect to have been some 50% greater than that calculated by the
Wonnacotts. Scale is measured in our model by the level of aggregate
output which could be produced when there is no underutilization of
capacity.
Besides the disadvantage in scale, we also find two other sources
of inefficiency in Canada in this earlier period -underutilizationof
capacity and the "country specific efficiency effect" (CSE). For
1962-64, unit production cost would have been 2.2% higher in Canada than
in the U.S. due to underutilization of capacity. The CSE effect has
been specified to include any differential effect due to unequal rates of
technical change, and hence includes the contribution of the R&D proxy
variable to unit cost differences. In essence, this effect is a
residual category which will include any systematic influence on
Canada-U.S. relative efficiency other than scale, capacity utilization,
and product mix. It will include any cost-reducing effects of increased
specialization (aggregate output held constant) not captured by the
product mix variable. For 1962-64, unit production cost would have been
2.2% higher in Canada than the U.S. due to CSE.17
The sources of inefficiency in Canada (scale, CSE and capacity
utilization) would have led to a substantially higher unit production
cost in Canada than in the U.S. in 1962-64 except for the favourable
impact of lower factor prices in Canada.
As we view the Canadian automobile industry vis a vis the U.S. in
1962-64 we see substantial 'scale' (or aggregate output) disadvantages in
Canada offset by lower factor prices —suggestingthat improvements in
scale, ceteris paribus, would potentially improve the industry's relative
performance.
Between 1965 and 1972, the Canadian auto producers apparently
rationalized their assembly production,and the scale of aggregate output
in Canada also increased substantially. By 1970-72, the scale
disadvantage to Canada had fallen by 45% from its 1962-64 level (from
21.1% in row 1 to 12.1% in row 2).
The reduction in the scale disadvantage was due to the faster growth
in Canadian production relative to U.S. production in the post 1965
period. Was this faster growth due to the Auto Pact? In Section V we
examine a counter-factual case -holdingauto trade between Canada and
the U.S. at its 1962-64 level and allowing the domestic Canadian market
to expand at the actual rate experienced over the 1966-1980 period in
order to answer this question.
We expected that unit production cost would have fallen
substantially in Canada as compared to the U.S. between 1962-64 and
1970-72 due to the narrowing of the scale disadvantage. In fact Canadian
relative unit production cost rose by 5.5 percentage points. Now do we
explain this surprising result, especially when movements in capacity18
utilization also favoured Canada over this period? First, Canada's
relative CSE, already at a disadvantage with respect to the U.S. in
1962-64, continued to deteriorate (by 3.5 percentage points in unit
production cost terms over the period). Recall that the scale effect
captures the reduction in unit cost resulting from the increase in
aggregate output. If rationalization of Canadian production
substantially reduced unit production cost in Canada, then the CSE term
should have shown a relative improvement for Canada over the 1962-64 to
1970-72 period. It does not. Of course, rationalization in the auto
industry could have improved CSE in Canada as compared to what would have
occurred in the absence of the Auto Pact, i.e., the CSE term might have
changed even more to Canada's disadvantage in other industries. We
consider this issue in more detail on page 27, where we demonstrate that
the Canadian automobile industry's CSE experience over the period from
1966 to 1972 was unlikely to have differed substantially from the
experience in total manufacturing.
An additional factor leading to an increased relative unit
production cost in Canada over this period is the deterioration in
Canada's very favourable factor price regime of 1962-64. The major
component of this deterioration was the price of capital services. In
1962-64, differences between the price of capital in the two countries
alone yielded 12.6% lower production costs in Canada than in the U.S. By
1970-72, this advantage to Canada had diminished to a 3% advantage in
unit production costs.
After 1965 intra—industry trade between Canada and U.S. expanded
rapidly even though Canada's average relative cost position19
deteriorated. A pattern developed (that has continuedto the present
time) in which Canada generated a trade surplus incompleted vehicles and
a deficit in original equipment parts. Since our data consistof
aggregated vehicle assembly and parts, they presumably mask(during
1970—72) a Canadian cost advantage in assembled vehicles(on average) and
a cost disadvantage in parts production.
Between 1970-72 and 1977-79, substantialchanges occurred in the
relative unit production cost between the twocountries. While the unit
production cost in 1970-72 was 6.9% higher in Canada than inthe U.S.,
by 1977-79 it was 2.9% lower in Canada; in 1979 alone, 8.9%lower.
This reversal in relative cost between the twocountries occurred because
of a substantial relative improvement in theprice of materials in
Canada's favour12 and because of a continued increasein the scale of
Canadian automobile production. Note, however, thesubstantial relative
decline in the Canadian CSE between the 1970—72 and1977-79 periods. If
the only difference between the costs of automobileproduction in the two
countries was the CSE, then Canadian unit productioncosts in 1979 would
have been 11.5% higher than costs in the U.S. Thisdeterioration in CSE
occurs despite the rationalization of the Canadian autoindustry.
Between 1979 and 1980, unit production costs fell 5.6percentage
points in Canada relative to the U.S. This largeone year change was
almost entirely due to the relative decline incapacity utilization in
the U.S.13
To summarize Table 3, in the fifteenyears between 1962-64 and
1977-79, unit production costs fell in Canada relative to theU.S., so
that in the latter period, Canadian unitproduction costs were well below20
that of the U.S. This overall relative decline in Canadian unit
production costs was itself the result of several conflicting movements.
First was the substantial improvement in the scale of Canadian automobile
production —aresult that some would attribute to the Auto Pact.
Second, the Canadian CSE declined relative to the U.S. Removing scale
effects, the efficiency level of Canadian automobile production declined
relative to U.S. production in the period following the Auto Pact.
Third, relative price changes between the U.S. and Canada occurred over
the fifteen year period, some to Canada's advantage and some to the
advantage of the U.S. Relative changes in product mix and in capacity
utilization had no major impact over this period.
The Depreciation of the Canadian Dollar
In Table 4, we reproduce the results of Table 3 except that exchange
rate movements in excess of changes in purchasing power parity (PPP) are
separated out as a distinct source of unit cost differences.14 From
Table 4, we see that the lower price of labour in Canada would have
created a 4.6% to 6.6% Canadian cost advantage (at PPP exchange rates)
over the U.S. throughout the period l962_80.15 The price of capital
services rose considerably in Canada relative to the U.S. so that the
Canadian advantage in capital costs fell sharply by 1970—72. The price
of materials changed substantially in favour of Canada over the period
from a 3% disadvantage (in terms of unit production costs) in 1962-64
to a 10% advantage in 1980.16
Movements in exchange rates relative to PPP accounted for the
worsening of Canada's relative unit production cost from the 1962-64 to21
1970—72 period in the sense that, had the exchange rate been at its PPP
level in 1962-64, Canadian unit production cost would have been 10%
higher than the U.S. cost; which should be compared with a 7%
differential in 1970-72 when the exchange rate was at its PPP level.
Only part of the improvement in the Canadian relative unit production
cost in the 1977 to 1980 period can be attributed to depreciation of
the Canadian dollar relative to its PPP level.'7
Output Price and Marginal Cost Differences
The second column of Table 5 gives the output price differences
between automobile wholesale prices in Canada and those in the U.S.
In 1962-64, wholesale prices in Canada were 4.8% above those in the
U.S. (in Canadian dollars). By way of contrast, in those sameyears
long-run marginal cost (i.e., marginal cost assuming full utilization of
capacity) was 2.6% higher in Canada, whereas short-run marginal cost was
7.1% lower in Canada due to relative underutilization of capacity. In
our model underutilization of capacity raises unit (average) cost and
lowers marginal cost in the short run. From 1962-64 to 1970-72, the
difference between Canadian and U.S. wholesale prices increased. The
difference between both short—run and long—run marginal costs also
increased, and marginal cost differences increased more substantially
than wholesale price differences. Between 1970-72 and 1977-79, wholesale
prices as well as marginal costs fell in Canada relative to the U.S, with
the reductions in marginal costs being more pronounced. In 1979 the
differential between Canadian and U.S. wholesale prices was less than the
differential between either short—run or long-run marginal costs. In22
1980, a year of relative underutilization of U.S. capacity, the Canadian
output price advantage was less than its advantage in long-run marginal
cost. Short-run marginal cost was higher in Canada than in the U.S.
From Table 5 it is obvious that swings in marginal costs were much
more pronounced than swings in prices. This suggests that automobile
firms were probably using pricing rules which involved a markup over
average variable cost that is only partially adjusted in the face of
changing market conditions, and that these firms have sufficient market
power to sustain this behaviour even when confronted by low levels of
capacity utilization and hence low levels of short—run marginal cost.23
V.A COUNTER-FACTUAL EXAMPLE -COSTCHARACTERISTICS OF CANADIAN
AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTION IN THE ABSENCE OF THE AUTO PACT
From Table 6 we see that, following the Auto Pact of1965, motor
vehicle output grew more quickly in Canada than in the U.S.leading to
increased relative efficiency and reduced unit productioncost in
Canada. But the output of the Canadian automobileindustry may have
grown as quickly without the Auto Pact, given the fast growth of income
and population and changing demographics of Canada in thepost-1965
period. In order to examine a hypothetical world which did not include
the Auto Pact, we made the following calculations.First, we calculated
that, in the 1962—64 period, the ratio of U.S. imports to Canadian
domestic production (parts and completed vehicles)was 26% and that 2% of
Canadian output was exported to the U.S. For theyears 1966 to 1980 we
assumed that in a no Auto Pact (NAP) hypothetical world netimports
from the U.S. to Canada would remain at thesepercentage levels. We also
assumed that exports from Canada to the U.S. above the 1962-64percentage
level would not have occurred and thereforewe deducted the value of
these exports from the value of domestic Canadian production.18Finally,
we assumed that imports from the U.S. to Canada above the 1962—64
percentage level would have been produced in Canada (we therefore added
these imports to the value of domestic Canadian production).19In this
hypothetical world, Canadian firms produce for the domestic marketrather
than being integrated into the North American market. Weincorporated
one other effect in making these hypothetical calculations. The
differential between wholesale prices in Canada and those inthe
U.S. narrowed after the introduction of the Auto Pact. Wehypothesized24
that in the absence of the Auto Pact, Canadian wholesale prices would
have remained at their 1962-64 ratio to U.S. wholesale prices (in
Canadian dollars). This calculation raises the wholesale price in Canada
in the post-1965 period by 3% in the absence of the Auto Pact. Assuming
a unitary elasticity of demand, we reduced Canadian output
correspondingly by 3%.
Using these hypothetical output data, we recalculated unit
production cost differences and their sources from equations 2 and 6,
assuming all other exogenous variables were unaffected by the
introduction of the Auto Pact. Table 6 presents the differences between
this hypothetical NAP world and actual experience.20
By 1970-72, we calculate that the Auto Pact had reduced unit
production cost in Canada by 3.1% over what it would have been during
those years in the absence of the Pact. This improvement in unit
production cost comes about primarily through improvements in scale and
CSE. If all that differed between the U.S. and Canada were scale (all
other variables held at their mean levels) then the increase in the
level of Canadian aggregate output due to the Auto Pact reduced unit
costs by 2.0%. As noted previously, rationalization of facilities should
influence the CSE effect.2' The Auto Pact led to a 0.6% improvement in
CSE. Directionally, these values are as expected. They are, however,
considerably lower than the proponents of the Auto Pact believe. Our
results suggest that most of the reduction in unit cost post—1965
relative to the U.S. was due to increases in aggregate output. The
majority of the output expansion which actually occurred over the 1962-6425
to 1970-72 period would have occurredanyway through the growth of the
domestic Canadian market.
Between 1970-72 and 1977-79, the improvements in Canadianunit
production costs vis avisthose in the U.S. in our NAP world mimicked
the improvements that actually occurred. We estimatethat in the absence
of the Auto Pact, unit production cost would have been1.7% higher in
Canada in 1977-79. Economies of scale attributableto the Auto Pact
result in a small decrease in cost (0.6% of unitproduction cost in
1977—79). The Auto Pact also reduced unit cost in Canadaby improving
CSE over what it would have been in the absence ofthe Pact; this
improvement (rationalization) increases slightlyover time and accounts
for a 0.9% lower unit production cost in 1979.Again, directionally the
effect is as expected but lower than theproponents of the Pact would
suggest.
Our empirical results demonstrate that the Auto Pactwas but one of
a number of forces impinging on the Canadian auto industry. TheAuto
Pact had its most significant effect by 1970—72,reducing unit production
cost in Canada by 3.1%; in later years this cost reductiondiminishes.
The impact of the Auto Pact was less thancommonly believed for two
reasons. First, aggregate sales in the domestic Canadian market
increased substantially leading to the realization ofscale economies by
domestic producers. Second, the datasuggest that after accounting for
scale, the technical efficiency of Canadian auto production fell
relative to that experienced in the U.S.; the Auto Pactdid improve
Canadian CSE over what it would have been but notsubstantially.26
Can these rather surprising results (at least in terms of the
conventional wisdom) be correct? We now proceed to demonstrate that our
results are consistent with auxiliary information which is not
conditional on our modelling activities. First, had the Auto Pact
eliminated efficiency differences, one would have expected by 1979 an
overwhelming Canadian cost advantage in automobile production, given
lower wage rates and the depreciation of the Canadian dollar. We
estimate that, given equal efficiency in the two countries, the Canadian
unit cost in 1979 would have been 20%-35% less than the U.S. cost. The
wholesale price was however only 4% lower in Canada. In addition, during
1979 Canada had a net deficit of $2.7 billion in trade in automobile
products with the U.S. under the Auto Pact. Neither output price
differentials nor trade patterns are consistent with a large Canadian
cost advantage.22
Second, our results are not in fact surprising when one considers
total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the two countries. The actual
growth rates in TFP are shown in Table 7. These rates are not computed
from the cost function model, but rather from the actual data using the
Tornqvist aggregation procedure. Hence the rates are independent of the
parameter estimates.
During the 1966—72 period the TFP growth rate was higher in Canada
than in the U.S. (1.5% versus 1.0%). However, if the 27% Canadian
efficiency disadvantage (see Table 3) were to be eliminated by 1972, the
Canadian TFP annual growth rate during the 1966-72 period would have had
to be 5%, over 3 times the actual rate! Over the longer 1966-79 period,
TFP growth in Canada is not substantially faster than in the U.S. These27
data on TFP growth rates underline our basic results —theAuto Pact does
not appear to have greatly improved the efficiency of Canadianautomobile
production.
We are now in a position to consider the question posed earlieras
to whether the deterioration in the Canadian relative CSEduring 1966-72
would have been substantially worse without the Auto Pact.Berndt and
Fuss (1986) estimate that TFP in U.S. totalmanufacturing grew at a rate
of 0.6% per annum over the 1965—73 period. ForCanada, the corresponding
rate has also been estimated as 0.6% over this period (Denny andFuss
(1980)). The similarity in relative Canada—U.S. TFP growth rates in
total manufacturing during 1965-73 suggests that the Canadian CSEin
manufacturing in general did not deteriorate to a significantlygreater
extent than occurred in automotive production. The muchmore rapid
output growth rate in automobile production (12.8% versus 4.7% in total
manufacturing during 1966—72) meant that economies of scale were
exploited to a greater extent in automobile manufacturing than in
manufacturing in general. This fact, only partially attributable to the
Auto Pact, accounts for the narrowing of the efficiencygap in automobile
manufacturing, whereas no such narrowing occurred in total
manufacturing.23
Most previous analysts of the Auto Pact (Beigie (1970), Wilton
(1976)) have been misled by equating labour productivity (LP)gains with
efficiency gains. LP grew much more rapidly in Canada than in theU.S.,
both after the Auto Pact agreement (1966—72) and during thelonger period
(1966-79) (Table 7). In fact, from Table 8 we can see thata Canadian
LP disadvantage of 29% in 1966 had been eliminated by1972, and had been28
replaced by a 23% advantage by 1979. But LP gains are not synonymous
with efficiency (TFP) gains. The growth in LP is equal to the growth in
TFP plus a factor substitution effect (due to changes in relative input
prices) plus a bias effect.24 This bias effect measures the differential
impact on labour demand relative to other factors of production of events
which can yield efficiency gains through TFP growth (e.g. scale
expansion, technical change, increases in capacity utilization), but is
not itself a measure of efficiency gains.
Table 9 demonstrates that less than 20% of the growth in LP is due
to efficiency gains (TFP growth). The remainder is due to substitution
away from labour (primarily towards materials) in response to a higher
wage rate relative to other factor prices, and the net labour saving
bias of increases in scale and technical change.2529
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The major finding of this study is that the Canada—U.S.Auto Pact's
selective trade liberalization provisions did notsubstantially improve
the efficiency of Canadian automobile production relativeto
U.S. production. This finding is consistent with Coxand Harris's (1985)
computational results that, as of 1976, the transportationequipment
industry in Canada would be the big winner from unilateralor
multilateral free trade primarily because "thepossibility of substantial
rationalization exists".26 Nevertheless, our empiricalresults are
surprising, since profit maximizing firms pursuingcost-minimizing
strategies would rationalize if permitted to doso, and the Auto Pact
provided the needed mechanism.
There exist several possible explanations forour result. First,
economies of scale and specialization disadvantages insmall economies
may be less than previously thought. Our estimated "actual" scale
elasticity for Canadian auto production for 1968 is 1.04, wellbelow
the estimate of 1.25 used by Cox and Harris.27But, if unexploited
economies of rationalization are not present, how doesone explain the
persistent 20% Canadian efficiency disadvantage? Second, theCanadian
domestic content provisions of the Auto Pactmay have prevented a high
degree of rationalization. This explanationappears unlikely, since as
noted in Section II, manufacturers have consistentlyexceeded the content
requirements by wide margins. Finally, and perhaps mostlikely, the
oligopolistic structure of the automobile industry in Canadaduring the
period l966_7228 probably meant that competitivepressures for cost30
reducing rationalization were minimal, and the Auto Pact did nothing
to increase them.
If the automobile industry in Canada is typical of oligopolistic
industries in small economies with unexploited opportunities for
rationalization, half—way measures such as the selective trade
liberalization policy represented by the Auto Pact are unlikely to
improve efficiency substantially. The existence of the opportunity to
rationalize appears inadequate compared to the competitive pressures
which can be unleashed by unrestricted trade liberalization.2931
FOOTNOTES
1.The three digit (SIC) automobile products industry (vehicleassembly
plus parts production) comprised 85% of the value of shipments in
the two digit transportation equipment industry in 1976, theyear
from which data were drawn to calibrate the Harris model.
2.Duty free entry was conditional on manufacturers maintaining minimum
assembly and value-added levels in Canada. Details of these
provisions are presented in the next section. Manufacturers who did
not qualify under the Auto Pact faced, as of 1965, Canadian tariffs
of 17.5% on completed vehicles and 0 to 25% on parts. U.S. tariffs
ranged from 6.5% to 8.5% on completed vehicles and parts.
3. In 1966 the "Big Three" U.S. manufacturers (G.M., Ford andChrysler)
controlled 86% of Canadian sales of new vehicles. In 1971, these
three companies controlled 75% of new vehicle sales.
4.The new trade/I.0. literature emphasizes that in an oligopolistic
setting one of the main gains from trade liberalization for the
small country is that the small country's producers, after
liberalization, will be faced with a larger market and more rivals
so that their perceived demand curves will become more elastic and
output prices will decline (Markusen (1981), Helpman and Krugman
(1985)). However in this case the bulk of the automotive industry
was controlled by the same firms on both sides of the
Canada—U.S. border. After liberalization, these firms did not face
new markets, and the number of major rivals in Canada remained the
same since only Volvo entered (as a small producer) as a result of32
the Auto Pact. Hence there is no reason to believe that the
perceived demand elasticities of the dominant firms were altered by
the Auto Pact.
5. Johnson (1963) reviewing the recommendations of the Bladen Royal
Commission Inquiry into the Canadian automobile industry, an inquiry
which preceded the Auto Pact, emphasized the protectionism inherent
in the type of content provisions contained in the Pact.
6. For details see Federal Task Force (1983) and Fuss and Waverman
(1987).
7. It might appear that the cost function model utilized would be
misspecified due to the content and production provisions of the
Auto Pact detailed in Section II. However, since these provisions
did not constrain the activities of the producers to any appreciable
extent, a provision-restricted cost function formulation would be
observationally equivalent to the unrestricted version that was
actually estimated. While we do not know whether the content
provisions in force in Canada prior to 1965 were binding, deleting
these observations from the sample yielded parameter estimates which
were not statistically significantly different from the parameter
estimates obtained using the complete sample. Neither the U.S. nor
Japan had domestic content or production provisions during the
sample period.
8.One additional set of constraints was imposed on the parameters. As
described in more detail in Fuss and Waverman (1987), the product
mix variable (13) was computed as an index where typical weights are
assigned to different classes of automobiles (sub-compact, compact,33
intermediate, etc.) and an average weight for actual production
computed. This variable fluctuated fairly tightly around 2500 for
Japan and 3500 for Canada and the U.S. Hence it almost served as a
dichotomous dummy variable for Japan versus North America. From
initial estimation results it became clear that second order
parameters involving T3 could not be estimated and were set to
zero. This had the effect of constraining the cost-product mix
elasticity to be a constant over time for each country, although the
elasticity could differ among countries.
9. Our estimates of the scale elasticity for the Canadian automobile
industry suggest only modest returns to increasing aggregate output
(1.08 in 1961 falling to 1.03 in 1980). Other econometric studies
report similar results. For example Fuss and Gupta (1981), using
establishment data divided into 6 aggregate size classes, estimate a
mean scale elasticity for 1965-68 of approximately one. Robidoux
and Lester (1986), using individual establishment data, estimate a
scale elasticity for 1979 which is slightly less than one. However,
even if aggregate output scale elasticities are close to unity,
substantial efficiency gains may be possible through reduction in
product lines to exploit economies of specialization. We will
consider this issue in more detail in Sections IV and V.
10. For a description of the Quadratic Lemma see Diewert (1976) and
Denny and Fuss (1983).
11. See Fuss and Waverman (1985, Data Appendix) for the rationale behind
this aggregation procedure.34
12. This substantial relative improvement in the price of materials is
somewhat puzzling. Below we distinguish between movements in the
value of the Canadian dollar and changes in factor prices in each
country. The depreciation of the Canadian dollar explains most of
the factor price effect. However, since materials are largely
semi-finished components, there is a possibility that if net imports
into Canada from the U.S. are an important component of materials
costs, transfer price changes could account for the observed changes
in relative materials costs. With higher tax rates in Canada than
the U.S., transnational automobile firms could raise the transfer
price of materials into Canadian production, thus transferring
profits to the lower tax regime -theU.S. This difference in tax
rates would explain relative increases in Canadian materials costs,
the opposite of actual experience.
13. The oil crisis of 1979 did not affect consumer demand in Canada for
North American produced automobiles to the same extent as in the
U.S., because actual shortages of gasoline did not occur in Canada
and the federal government subsidized the price of crude oil in
order to maintain a price below world levels.
14. The purchasing power parity calculations underlying this
decomposition and the decomposition formulas can be found in Fuss
and Waverman (1987).
15.If the wage rate were constant in both countries over a two year
period, but the Canadian dollar appreciated by 5% relative to its
purchasing power parity rate in that period, then it would appear in
the results of Table 3 that the Canadian wage rate rose by 5%35
relative to the U.S. rate.In Table 4 this change in relative wage
rates caused by exchange rate fluctuations is allocated to an
exchange rate effect. By using this convention we are implicitly
adopting a partial equilibrium framework since we assume, for the
purposes of this discussion, that exchange rate changes have no
effect on factor prices measured in a country's own currency.
16.If net imports of materials into Canada from the United States form
an important component of material costs then the exchange rate
effect could be overestimated and the materials price effect
underestimated. This may occur because, while, for example, a
devaluation of the Canadian dollar makes inputs into U.S. production
purchased in the U.S. more expensive as measured in Canadian
dollars, inputs into Canadian production purchased in the
U.S. (presumably materials) will also be more expensive in Canadian
dollars. Hence, some of the apparent factor price advantage to
Canadian producers from devaluation will cancel out. Similarly, the
corresponding appreciation of the U.S. dollar will not lead to an
increase in material prices (in Canadian dollars) for those
materials imported from Canada. The evidence from Table 4 is that
this complication is probably not of importance empirically. The
Canadian advantage due to lower material prices increased
considerably during 1977—80, the period of substantial devaluation
of the Canadian dollar.
17. From a different perspective, the depreciation of the Canadian
dollar relative to par value with the U.S. dollar (which existed
in the mid 1970's) is the main reason for the Canadian cost36
advantage as of 1980. The further depreciation of the Canadian
dollar during the l980s has probably increased the Canadian cost
advantage.
18. We also deducted from the value of Canadian output the materials
inputs which would have been used to produce these finished vehicle
exports. The materials input to assembly output ratio was held at
its average 1962-64 value.
19. Offsetting changes were made to the value of U.S. production to
ensure that total output matched actual values.
20. It is possible that the Canadian wage rate would have been lower
without the Auto Pact since the United Auto Workers may have been
less successful in pressing for nominal wage parity in vehicle
manufacturing. However this effect, if operative, would further
reduce the cost-savings attributable to the Auto Pact. The
hypothetical exercise described in this section is theoretically
susceptible to the Lucas Critique since the cost function parameters
might not be invariant to the variation in policies, as assumed.
We expect this issue to be unimportant empirically since, as
discussed in Section II, the domestic content provisions introduced
by the Auto Pact did not become binding constraints.
21. We did not change the product mix variable to take account of the
fact that a reversal of rationalization would influence this
variable. The actual effect of this variable on unit cost
differences is minimal and any change in the variable could also be
expected to have a minimal effect.37
22. Since 1982 Canada has been in a surplus position with respect to
trade with the U.S. under the Auto Pact. This fact does not
diminish our argument since by 1982 a further (and continuing)
substantial devaluation of the Canadian dollar had occurred.
23. The thrust of this section is supported by Baldwin and Gorecki's
(1986) Canada-U.S. value-added TFP level comparisons which utilize
disaggregated Canadian individual establishment data. They find
that for the two digit transportation equipment industry (consisting
of 8 four digit sub-industries), the Canadian industry was only 72%
as efficient as its U.S. counterpart in 1970, and only 67% as
efficient in 1979. After eliminating the effect of scale economies,
Baldwin and Gorecki estimate, that the Canadian CSE disadvantage (in
terms of productivity rather than cost efficiency) was 23% in 1970
and 22% in 1979.
24. For a derivation of this result see Fuss and Waverman (1987).
25. The fact that LP grew more rapidly than TFP in this industry also
holds for value-added measures of productivity. Sharpe (1983)
obtained the following results on a value—added basis:
Productivity 1961—73 1973-79
Industry Measure (average % growth) (average % growth)
U.S. CANADA U.S. CANADA
transportation LP 3.6 6.4 1.0 3.3
equi pment
TFP 2.9 2.4 0.3 0.7
motor vehicles LP 4.3 8.5 1.6 1.5
& equipment
TFP not calculated not calculated38
26. Ccx and Harris (1985) p.131.
27. Cox and Harris used an estimate that was approximately half-way
between the econometric estimate for 1968 calculated by Fuss and
Gupta (1981) and the engineering estimate contained in Gorecki
(1978). Our estimate is very close to the Fuss and Gupta estimate.
As noted by Ccx and Harris, the econometric estimates are
consistently below engineering estimates. However, since the
engineering estimates assume a single product line, they include any
theoretical cost savings from specialization. Had we applied Ccx
and Harris's scale elasticity estimate of 1.25 to our aggregate
output growth, we would have obtained a larger efficiency gain
attributable to scale economies under the Auto Pact but a
correspondingly smaller (probably negative) gain attributable to CSE
(i.e. specialization), since the sum of the two (relative TFP
growth) would remain unchanged.
28. After the oil crisis of 1973, the switch in consumer preferences
towards small energy—efficient automobiles led to increased
competitive pressures from European and Japanese producers. The
Voluntary Restraints Agreements between Japan and Canada and the
U.S. since 1981 have substantially reduced the competitive threat of
Japanese imports.
29. We are not suggesting that the selective trade liberalization of the
Auto Pact provided no significant benefits to Canada, but rather
that a substantial decline in Canadian relative unit cost was not
among the benefits. The elimination of tariffs for North American
producers led to a very large increase in intra-industry trade39
across the U.S.-Canada border as producers exploited intra-industry
cost advantages. In addition, Canada has been a clear winner in
terms of the distribution of production. We estimate that the Auto
Pact led to a 52% increase in Canadian production capacity by 1970
over what it otherwise would have been, although this advantage
declined to 24% by 1975 (Fuss and Waverman 1987). U.S. production
capacity was 4% less in 1970 than it would have been without the
Auto Pact. This disadvantage declined to 2% by 1975.40
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Factor Own Price Elasticities
(computed at the mean data point for each country)





Elasticities of Substitution (Allen—Uzawa)
(computed at the mean data point for each country)
Inputs United States Canada
Capital-Materials 0.35 0.17
Capital-Labour 0.58 0.22
Labour—Materials 0.67 0.53TABLE 2
Cost-Output Elasticities, Scale Elasticities, Capacity
Utilization Elasticities, Technical Change Elasticities, and
Product Mix Elasticities
(computed at the mean data point for each country)
Elasticity United States Canada
Cost—Output 0.93 0.96
Scale 1.07 1.04
Cost-Capacity Utilization 0.82 0.79
Cost-Technical Change -0.24 -0.21


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Output Price and Marginal Cost Differences
Output Price Short-Run Marginal Long—Run Marginal
Time Period Difference* Cost Difference* Cost Difference*
1962-64 4.8 -7.1 2.6
1970-72 6.0 4.4 10.3
1977-79 -1.4 -9.8 —2.3
1979 -3.8 -14.8 -6.8
1980 —2.4 2.8 —4.9
*Canada
u.s.- 1)X100TABLE 6
Canadian Relative Unit Cost Reductions Due to the Auto Pact




Time Cost Scale Specific
Period Reduction Economies Efficiency
(%)*
1970-72 3.1 2.0 0.6
1977—79 1.7 0.6 0.8
1979 1.4 0.3 0.9
1980 1.9 0.6 0.9
* Canada ______— 1)x 100TABLE 7
Annual Growth Rates in the Automobile Industry (%)
TOTALFACTOR LABOUR
OUTPUT PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY
U.S. CANADA U.S. CANADA U.S. CANADA
1966-72 2.8 12.8 1.0 1.5 3.0 8.7
1966-79 3.5 9.8 1.1 1.3 2.5 7.2TABLE 8
Labour Productivity
(Real Output/Hr. Worked)
Canada U.S. % U.S. Advantage*
1966 25.4 32.7 28.7
1972 40.8 40.0 -2.0




Labour Productivity Growth in the Canadian
Automobile Industry and Its Sources
% CONTRIBUTION DUE:
Labour Total Factor
Time Productivity Productivity Factor
Period Growth Rate (%) Growth BiasSubstitution
1966-72 8.7 17.8 55.8 26.4
1966-79 7.2 18.6 60.7 20.7